Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses by Donovan, Michael D. & Searles, David A.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 4 Article 4
1999
Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How
to Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses
Michael D. Donovan
Partner, Donovan, Miller, LLC, Philadelphia, PA
David A. Searles
Counsel, Donovan, Miller, LLC, Philadelphia, PA
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael D. Donovan & David A. Searles Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses, 10
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 269 (1998).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol10/iss4/4
FEATURE
ARTICLES
Preserving Judical Recourse for Consumers:
How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses
by Michael D. Donovan
and David A. Searles
I. Introduction
Our society is known for its litigious
nature. Courtroom dramas are staples
of television and movies. The media,
from specialized cable shows to
mainstream news stories and print
journalism, seem to revel in the
coverage of lawsuits and the litigants
involved. Among the consequences of
this increased focus on our legal
system is the average person's
assumption that his or her rights can be
vindicated in a court of law, complete
with a jury of one's peers, a fair and
impartial judge, certain procedural
safeguards and the right to appeal
from an adverse decision. Such an
assumption, however, may well be
misplaced.
Unknown to most consumers is that,
by entering into many standard form
contracts today - consumer financing,
employment, insurance, health plans -
they may have given up rights to seek
redress in a judicial forum and, instead,
have bound themselves to an
arbitration process. Although forgoing
litigation in favor of arbitration may
seem, at first glance, merely
substituting one objective forum for
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another, or opting for an equally fair
yet more efficient process, that is often
not the case.1
For example, a consumer entering
into a financing contract may be bound
to arbitrate while the lender retains the
right to go to court.2 An arbitration
clause in an employment agreement
may provide that the employer chooses
the arbitrator and excludes the
employee from the selection process.3
A health care plan may permit the care
provider to unilaterally reject an
arbitration award if it does not like the
result.4
Thus, arbitration clauses are often
biased in favor of the business entity
party to the contract. This is not
surprising in view of the fact that it is
the business that drafted the contract.
Loyola Consumer Law Review * 2691998
These contracts are classic examples of
adhesion contracts in that they are (1)
in standardized format, using boiler-
plate provisions, (2) drafted by the
party in a stronger bargaining position,
and (3) imposed on consumers on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. The effect of
such clauses is often to deprive or
discourage consumers from enforcing
their common law and statutory rights
in judicial forums. As a result,
consumers risk being bound by
unreviewable decisions reached
without most of the procedural and
substantive safeguards that are
available in a court setting.
This article will examine the status of
arbitration clauses in general under
recent Supreme Court case law and in
particular in consumer cases. It will
then discuss a number of theories for
invalidating arbitration clauses in
consumer cases so as to preserve the
right to judicial redress for grievances.
II. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA").5 The FAA
represented an attempt to put
arbitration agreements on an equal
footing with, and make them just as
enforceable as, other contracts. As
Section 2 of the FAA states, written
arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any
contract. "
6
Although lenders or other business
entities are quick to cite to the FAA as
governing their arbitration agreements
with consumers, such agreements were
not the focus of the FAA when it was
enacted.7 The legislative history of the
FAA shows that the purpose of the
FAA was to settle disputes between
businesses in the context of commercial
disputes involving entities with
relatively equal bargaining power and
working knowledge of the kinds of
disputes likely to arise in that context.8
There is nothing in the FAA that
indicates an intention that adhesive
agreements between a business and a
consumer be included within the reach
of the Act.9
Some commentators are of the view
that the Supreme Court has interpreted
the FAA in such a way as to create a
national policy favoring arbitration
agreements and giving them a special
and protected status in the law of
contract."° This preference for
arbitration was announced by the
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp."
That case involved two business
entities, a contractor and a hospital,
and their broad binding arbitration
agreement purporting to cover all
disputes arising from or relating to
construction of the hospital. Without
providing any historical or policy
justification, the Court concluded that
federal policy favored arbitration over
litigation: "Courts of Appeal have ...
consistently concluded that questions
of arbitrability must be addressed with
a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration. We agree."12- Since
Moses H. Cone, the Court and lower
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courts have repeated the notion that
federal policy favors arbitration, but
have never explained the source of that
policy.13
More recently, however, the Supreme
Court decided the case of First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.4 In First
Options, the Court held that the issue of
who (arbitrator or court) should decide
arbitrability is a question for the courts,
unless there is "clear and unmistakable
evidence" that the parties agreed
otherwise.15 The Court emphasized
that the initial issue of the existence of a
valid agreement is different from the
subsequent question of "the scope of a
valid arbitration agreement."1 6 As to
the former issue, whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists, ordinary
state law principles that govern the
formation of contracts should control. 7
It is only with respect to the latter
question, the scope of the agreement,
that the law "reverses the
presumption" so that the federal policy
in favor of arbitration will apply to
resolve any doubts about the issues to
be arbitrated. 8 Accordingly, the Court
has made it clear that the federal policy
favoring arbitration does not apply to
issues concerning the validity,
revocability and enforceability of
contracts containing arbitration
clauses.
The Court's holding in First Options
has led other courts to question the
continuing vitality of a thirty-one year
old Supreme Court case, Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.19 In
Prima Paint, the Court held that a claim
of fraud in the inducement of the entire
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contract is for the arbitrator to decide,
while such a claim directed at the
arbitration clause itself is for a court to
decide.20 Several courts have now
recognized that, since the assumption
that an agreement to arbitrate was
made voluntarily is essential to the
First Options inquiry, the related and
antecedent question of whether the
agreement is the product of fraud,
unconscionability or coercion must be
an issue for the courts as well.2
This is especially true where the
contract at issue involves a typical
consumer because the contract is
generally one of adhesion. In such
situations, arbitration clauses are
subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny.22 As the Court has
emphasized, "arbitration is simply... a
matter of contract between the
parties."23 Arbitration is a matter of
informed consent, not hidden coercion
or blind acquiescence. 24 When the
parties to a contract are fully informed,
possess equal bargaining power and
reasonably expect certain provisions or
terms, as is typically the case in
commercial transactions among
merchants, arbitration agreements are
routinely enforced and, in fact, enjoy a
preferred status in the courts. But
when such clauses are buried in the
fine print of complex legal documents
that are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis to less sophisticated consumers
who typically do not even understand
either the nature or the significance of
mandatory arbitration, general contract
principles require a closer scrutiny of
the process and the fairness of the
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purported bargain.2 Where there is an
unreasonably high likelihood of
misapprehension, unfairness or one-
sidedness, courts have not hesitated to
invalidate arbitration clauses based, for
example, on findings of fraud in
factum, fraud in the inducement, lack
of mutuality and unconscionability.26
III. Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Cases
Arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts reflect a wide variety of
substantive inequities. For one, the
clauses may be obscured in fine print
and buried deep in multi-copy
standard forms. For another, even
assuming that a consumer could find
the clause, it may be written in dense,
often contradictory and inconsistent
language. The following is an example
of a typical arbitration clause found on
the reverse side of a consumer loan
contract, printed here in slightly larger
type than its actual size:
ARBITRATION - All disputes, claims
or controversies arising from or relating
to this contract or the relationships which
result from this contract, or the validity
of this arbitration clause or the entire
contract, shall be resolved by binding
arbitration by one arbitrator selected by
us with consent of you. * ** . The parties
agree and understand that they choose
arbitration instead of litigation to resolve
disputes. The parties understand that
they have a right or opportunity to
litigate disputes through a court, but that
they prefer to resolve their disputes
through arbitration, except as provided
herein. THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND
KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY
HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS
CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT
ACTION BY US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN).
The parties agree and understand that all
disputes arising under case law, statutory
law, and all other laws including, but not
limited to, all contract, tort, and property
disputes, will be subject to binding
arbitration in accord with this contract.
The parties agree and understand that
the arbitrator shall have all powers
provided by the law and the contract.
These powers include all legal and
equitable remedies, including, but not
limited to, money damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
Notwithstanding anything hereunto the
contrary, we retain an option to use
judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a
mortgage, deed of trust, or other security
agreement relating to the real property
secured in a transaction underlying this
arbitration agreement, or to enforce the
monetary obligation secured by the real
property, or to foreclose on the real
property. Such judicial relief would take
the form of a lawsuit. The institution and
maintenance of an action for judicial relief
in a court to foreclose upon any collateral,
to obtain a money judgment or to enforce
the mortgage or deed of trust, shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of any
party to compel arbitration regarding any
other dispute or remedy subject to
arbitration in this contract, including the
filing of a counterclaim in a suit brought
by us pursuant to this provision.
The above clause illustrates many of
the unfair, overreaching and deceptive
characteristics of arbitration clauses.
The clause is in fine print and located
upside down on the reverse side of a
multi-copy standard form.
Substantively, the clause is totally one-
sided. While it begins by stating that all
disputes are to be resolved by
arbitration, well into the clause is a
provision allowing the lender, but not
the consumer, the option to resort to a
judicial forum for relief by filing a
lawsuit. Further, the clause provides
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that even if the lender opts to enforce
certain rights under an action for
judicial relief, it does not waive its
right to compel arbitration as to other
disputes under the contract, including
any counterclaim of the consumer in a
lawsuit initiated by the lender. Thus,
the clause would permit the lender to
file a lawsuit in court, but relegates the
consumer's counterclaims to
arbitration.
The clause also allows the lender to
select the arbitrator.27 There is no
indication of what institution, if any,
would oversee or operate the
arbitration process, no information
concerning what kind of discovery
rights, if any, are available, no
information about the costs, what
deadlines might be applicable, how or
with whom to initiate the arbitration,
where it might be held or even whether
the consumer has the opportunity to
appear before the arbitrator.
Beyond the inherent substantive
unfairness of the clause, the limited
discovery permitted in most
arbitrations makes a fair resolution
even less likely for the average
consumer. As Professor Budnitz points
out, many consumers may wish to
assert claims based on consumer
protection statutes such as the Truth in
Lending Act,29 the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act,3° the Fair Credit
Billing Act,31 or state unfair and
deceptive acts or practices laws. Often,
the consumer's claims will be based on
the documents used in the transaction:
disclosure statement, note, security
instrument, etc. Some or all of the
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relevant documents may not be in the
consumer's possession. Because the
parties are generally limited to
subpoenas duces tecum in an
arbitration, the documents may be
difficult to obtain from the financial
institution in time to adequately
prepare a case. Seeing documents at a
hearing for the first time does not
permit a consumer the opportunity for
adequate analysis and presentation of
his case. An arbitrator may be reluctant
to postpone the hearing to allow
enough time to study the documents
because that would result in delay.32
Further, raising claims under
consumer protection statutes
presupposes an arbitrator qualified to
evaluate the claims. That may not be a
correct assumption. Consumer
protection statutes are complex;
adequate evaluation requires
knowledge not only of the statute, but
of regulations, official commentary and
case law, all of which may change
periodically. Arbitrators may be more
likely to rely on their own notions of
fairness or justice, which will not
necessarily lead to results intended by
the drafters of the consumer protection
legislation.33
A number of theories are available to
challenge the enforceability of
arbitration clauses such as the one set
forth above. The following section will
discuss some of those theories.
IV. Theories for Invalidating
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Cases
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A. Burdens of Proof
Before reviewing the various legal
grounds on which arbitration clauses
can be challenged, it might be helpful
to emphasize that, under most state
laws,3 -the burden of demonstrating
the existence of an enforceable
arbitration agreement is on the party
seeking to compel arbitration. There
are two reasons that the burden should
rest on that party.
1. Risk shifting terms or exclusions must
be plain, clear and conspicuous.
The drafters of a contract may have a
substantial burden of proof due to the
"take it or leave it" nature of the
contract containing an arbitration
clause.3 5 The burden is on the drafter
of the standard form contract to show
that the consumer had knowledge of
any unusual, unexpected or
inconsistent term; 36 risk-shifting terms
or exclusions must be plain, clear and
conspicuous.37 A significant factor is
whether the consumer, in light of his or
her sophistication, the nature of the
agreement and the complexity of the
relationship, reasonably expected that
they would be subjected to an
arbitration clause that would deprive
them of the ability to resolve any
disputes in an impartial, public forum
with all the due process rights and
duties to follow the law as are available
in a court.38
Also, when scrutinizing adhesion
contracts, courts are empowered to
ensure that the enforcement of clauses
that materially impinge on substantial
rights of the weaker party does not
result in oppression or unfair surprise.
For example, Section 2-302(a) of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
allows the court to refuse to enforce the
contract as a whole or any single clause
or group of clauses that is permeated
by unconscionabiity. 9 Similarly, the
Restatement Second, Contracts, § 208
directs the court to determine as a
matter of law whether a standardized
contract or a term therein is
unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable. Both the Restatement
and the UCC strongly suggest that the
court should hold an evidentiary
hearing before ruling on the validity of
the arbitration clause.40
2. The proponent of a contractual
provision that effects a waiver of the other
party's constitutional rights must prove
the existence of the agreement and that
there was a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver.
The proponent of an arbitration
clause will often proceed from the false
premise that the consumer has the
initial burden of proof before a court
on a motion to compel arbitration. In
fact, First Options makes it clear that it
is the proponent of the clause that has
the initial burden of proving the
existence of a valid agreement. In First
Options, the Court emphasized that
"arbitration is simply a matter of
contract between the parties; it is a way
to resolve those disputes - but only
those disputes - that the parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration."41 Since
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ordinary state law principles governing
the formation of contracts apply to the
question of whether a valid agreement
exists, those principles likewise assign
the burden of proof 2
Both federal law and ordinary
contract principles establish that the
proponent of any clause that effects a
waiver of the other party's
constitutional rights has the burden of
proving both the existence of a valid
agreement and that there was a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver.43 Under federal law, courts
must "indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and.
. [may] not presume acquiescence in
the loss of such rights."44 Likewise,
most state contract law specifically
provides that any waiver of a right
must be knowing, intelligent,
voluntary, unequivocal and clearly
evinced.4 It is equally well settled that
a party seeking to compel arbitration
bears the burden of showing that the
party opposing arbitration "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily" waived
his right to a trial in court by a jury of
his or her peers. 6
The Supreme Court has declared that
"a waiver of constitutional rights in
any context must, at the very least, be
clear."47 In Fuentes, the Court
distinguished its earlier decision in D.
H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.;.48 D. H.
Overmyer involved a corporate party
that had waived its rights by signing a
confession of judgment in exchange for
a release of mechanic's liens and
certain monetary benefits on future
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payments. By contrast, the situation in
Fuentes- presented a waiver by a much
weaker party to a contract:
There was no bargaining over
contractual terms between the
parties who, in any event, were far
from equal in bargaining power.
The purported waiver provision
was a printed part of a form sales
contract and a necessary condition
of the sale. The appellees made no
showing whatever that the
appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of
the fine print now relied upon as a
waiver of constitutional rights. 9
Supreme Court case law implicitly
adopts a four-factor balancing test for
when courts should accept or reject a
claim of waiver in the civil context.50
The courts should examine 1) "the
visibility and clarity of the waiver
itself, 2) the relative knowledge and
economic power possessed by the
parties, 3) the degree of voluntariness
of the purported agreement, and 4) the
substantive fairness of the purported
agreement."51
Proponents of arbitration may
contend that the case of Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto2 precludes
application of these principles to
arbitration clauses. That contention is
mistaken. While it is true that
arbitration clauses may not be
subjected to positive state law
requirements that are different from
general contract principles, there is
nothing in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, including Doctor's
Associates, which exempts arbitration
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clauses that purport to waive
constitutional rights from the basic
waiver principles that apply to all
contracts.
Doctor's Associates does not overrule
the general contract requirement of a
plain, clear and conspicuous statement
for terms that are beyond the
reasonable expectations of the weaker
party. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered a state statute that singled
out arbitration clauses for special
treatment. That statute was applicable
only to arbitration provisions, not to
enforcement of contracts generally and
thus ran afoul of the
FANs requirement
that arbitration Courts reco
clauses not be placed term or a cc
on an unequal
footing.5 3 But the unconscion
Court, while there is "an
invalidating the state meaningful
statute, reiterated
that generally part of one
applicable contract together wi
defenses may be
applied to invalidate terms whid
the state statute, unreasonab
reiterated that
generally applicable to the othe
contract defenses
may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without
contravening the FAA.'
B. Unconscionability - The Absence
of Meaningful Choice Together With
Terms Unreasonably Favorable to
Other Party
A leading ground for attacking
arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts is their unconscionability. An
arbitration clause must be viewed "in
the light of its setting, purpose and
effect," and invalidated or interpreted
to "avoid unconscionable results."55 An
arbitration clause that is so one-sided
as to be unconscionable should not be
enforced.5 6
Courts recognize that a term or a
contract is unconscionable when there
is "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are
unreasonably
favorable to the
nize that a other party."5 7 In
tract is determining whether
Wle when an agreement is
unconscionable,
bsence of courts focus not only
,hoice on the on the process
whereby the
the parties agreement was
contract made, to see whether
the parties lacked
are meaningful choice,
,favorable but also on the
arty. " substantive terms ofthe agreement, to see
whether the terms
unreasonably favor one party.m
Arbitration clauses may be tainted both
because they result from an unfair
process characterized by a massive
disparity in bargaining power in which
the consumer had no meaningful
choice and because the terms are
unreasonably favorable to the
company.9
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1. Adhesion contracts are subject to a
higher level of judicial scrutiny
Adhesion contracts are subject to a
higher level of judicial scrutiny, and
courts will deny enforcement if the
contract or provision is outside the
reasonable expectations of the weaker
party.s0 As the Supreme Court has
explained:
Ordinarily, one who signs an
agreement without full knowledge
of its terms might be held to
assume the risk that he has
entered a one-sided bargain. But
when a party of little bargaining
power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially
unreasonable contract with little
or no knowledge of its terms, it is
hardly likely that his consent, or
even an objective manifestation of
his consent, was ever given to all
of the terms. In such a case the
usual rule that the terms of the
agreement are not to be
questioned should be abandoned
and the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract
are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld.6'
An adhesion contract that is based on
a lack of meaningful choice and
contains terms that are so one-sided as
to be oppressive is invalid. 62 Courts
have frequently found "the absence of
a meaningful bargain" in an adhesion
contract because it "usually involves a
party whose circumstances, perhaps
his unworldliness or ignorance, when
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compared with the circumstances of
the other party, make his knowing
assent to the fine-point terms
fictional. "63
When a sophisticated party has
drafted a standard form fine print
contract and the weaker party lacks a
meaningful choice, courts have been
especially vigilant in preventing any
unconscionability resulting from
enforcement of the agreement.64 Courts
have recognized, for example, that the
"need for application of this standard
[unconscionability] is most acute when
the professional seller is seeking the
trade of those most subject to
exploitation-the uneducated, the
inexperienced and the people of low
income." 6
The requisite higher level of judicial
scrutiny is demonstrated by the factors
utilized by the court in John Deere
Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh.66 First, the
contracts were "printed form or boiler
plate contracts drawn skillfully by the
party in the strongest economic
position, which establish industry-
wide standards offered on a take it or
leave it basis to the party in a weaker
economic position." Second, the
circumstances surrounding the
execution of the contract, its
commercial setting, purpose and effect
showed that the plaintiffs were duped
into agreeing to the standard form
contracts without any understanding
of their essential terms or character
through the device of the two contract
deceit utilized by the defendants.
Third, the arbitration clause deprived
plaintiffs of their right to go to court,
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preserves that right for defendants and
yet was hidden in "a mass of fine print
trivia" and in an inconspicuous place.6 7
Fourth, the arbitration clause was
phrased so as to be ambiguous and
"incomprehensible to the layman or
[to] divert his attention from the
problems raised by [it] or the rights
given up through [it]." Fifth, the
arbitration clause manifested an
overall imbalance in the obligations
and rights of defendants vis-a-vis
plaintiffs. Sixth, the contracts
containing the arbitration clause
exemplified "exploitation of the
underprivileged, unsophisticated and
uneducated." And seventh, the
contracts rested on a gross inequality of
bargaining or economic power, in that
plaintiffs did not have the resources to
bargain regarding any of the terms
relating to the arbitration clause.
A similar analysis led to a finding of
unconscionability in an employment
arbitration agreement in Hooters of
America, Inc. v. Phillips.6 In that case,
the court applied the six factor analysis
of unconscionability required by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:69 (1)
the nature of the injuries suffered by
the party sought to be held to the
contract; (2) whether that party is a
substantial business concern; (3)
disparity in the parties' bargaining
power; (4) the parties' relative
sophistication; (5) whether there is an
element of surprise in the contract's
terms; and (6) the conspicuousness of
the terms.
In applying that test, the court found
as to the first factor that the injuries
suffered by the female employee who
sought to bring suit for sexual
harassment were substantial because
she would be stripped of numerous
substantial remedies under Title VII,
such as rights to compensatory
damages, back pay relief, preemptory
relief, punitive damages and attorney
fees. Further, she would be faced with
numerous unfair procedural rules:
limitations on discovery, one-way
witness disclosure and sequestration,
employer control over the official
record and sharply curtailed judicial
review. As to the other factors, the
employee was obviously not a
"substantial business concern" and
there was clearly a marked disparity in
the parties' bargaining power and in
their relative sophistication. Finally, the
court considered that there was an
"extreme element of surprise to the
harshness" of the arbitration
agreement because the procedural
rules governing arbitration were not
available to the employee at the initial
orientation meeting when the
agreement was signed.70
2. Arbitration clauses as procedurally
unconscionable
The process by which a consumer
enters into a contract may involve
elements that courts have identified as
demonstrating procedural
unconscionability.7 First, due to the
gross disparity in the level of
sophistication and business
understanding of a consumer as
compared with other parties, it may be
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clear that the consumer did not have a
reasonable opportunity to understand
the terms and conditions of the
agreement. Second, there may be no
opportunity for meaningful
negotiation over the terms of the
arbitration clause. Third, the agreement
containing the arbitration clause may
be printed in fine print inconspicuously
placed on the reverse side of a
boilerplate form drafted solely by the
party in the strongest bargaining
position. Fourth, the terms of the
contract may not have been explained
to the consumer, and the arbitration
clause, in particular, may not have
even been pointed out to the consumer.
Fifth, a consumer may not feel he or
she has a meaningful choice, but
instead understands the agreement to
be on a "take it or leave it" basis. Sixth,
the stronger party may have used
deceptive practices to obscure not just
the terms of the contract, but also its
essential character.72
In Sosa, for example, an arbitration
clause that was contained in an
agreement thrust upon a patient just
"minutes away" from surgery, on a
printed form drafted by the doctor
seeking to enforce it, was signed by the
patient when she was in a state of
anxiety and felt rushed to sign, and
which was never discussed with the
patient at any time, was found to be
procedurally unconscionable. 73 In
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., the court also
found that procedural
unconscionability invalidated an
arbitration clause because the plaintiff
had no "realistic ability to modify the
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terms of the employment contract,"
that were presented to him as standard,
non-negotiable terms after he accepted
employment.74 The plaintiff in that case
was a business executive commanding
an annual salary of $150,000, not an
unsophisticated consumer. The
plaintiff, who brought a wrongful
discharge action that his employer
sought to stay on the basis of the
arbitration clause, said that the contract
was presented to him on a "take-it-or-
leave-it basis." The court found that the
agreement to arbitrate was part of a
contract of adhesion and was
procedurally unconscionable. 7
3. Arbitration clauses as substantively
unconscionable
An arbitration clause may also be
fatally flawed because its terms are
substantively unconscionable. Such
clauses are often structured to be
manifestly unfair to consumers, who
are forced to irrevocably relinquish
their right to a day in court while the
stronger party retains the right to seek
a judicial remedy whenever it chooses.
As such, consumers are presented with
a classic case of "heads I win, tails you
lose." 76 In Saika v. Gold, a medical
malpractice action, the court found an
arbitration agreement invalid because
it allowed the doctor to obtain a trial de
novo if the patient won, but afforded
no such right to the patient if the
doctor won. Therefore, according to the
court, the agreement rendered an
illusory remedy to one party to the
benefit of the other. A court of equity
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would not enforce such a substantively
unconscionable agreement, which
"contravene[d] the strong public policy
in favor of arbitration." 77
Similarly, in Fritz v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 78 the Delaware Chancery Court
refused to enforce an arbitration clause
in an insurance contract because its
terms were substantively
unconscionable. In that case, an
arbitration award automatically bound
the insured but the insurer was bound
only if it gave its written consent. The
court stated:
The effect of this one-sided
consent to arbitration, therefore,
allows Nationwide to avoid any
award it chooses not to consent to
while prohibiting [the insured]
any discretion as to the acceptance
of an award. Nationwide cannot
have it both ways. It cannot
require compulsory binding
arbitration then treat it as non-
binding to it. In reality, under the
contract Nationwide had not
agreed to binding arbitration at
all, but merely provided that it
might later require [the insured] to
submit to binding arbitration.
These terms unreasonably favor
Nationwide and are therefore
unconscionable. The compulsory
arbitration clause in the insurance
policy is therefore void.9
In Germantown Manufacturing Co. v.
Rawlinson,8° the court found that a
contract which caused a party to assent
to a confession of judgment clause was
unconscionable because the clause was
"the essence of a material, risk-shifting
term.. .which dispense[d] with the
signer's day in court." The clause was
contained in a contract that the wife, in
a weakened and emotionally depleted
condition, was misled into signing.
The substantive unconscionability of
an arbitration clause is magnified in
view of the wide disparity in the status
and the business understanding of the
consumer as compared with the
company representatives. In Wagner v.
Rummel,81 the plaintiff sought specific
performance of an agreement to buy
land at a price that was roughly 100
times less than its value. The
agreement had been signed by a
decedent who was "unsophisticated, at
best, if not illiterate, regarding business
matters and legal documents," with
"little or no schooling." 2 The trial court
had refused to consider the defense of
unconscionability to the contract
because it had not been affirmatively
pleaded. The appellate court reversed,
remanding so that evidence regarding
the decedent's status could be
considered in light of the doctrine of
unconscionability.13
C. Fraud in Factum - Clause
Unenforceable When Material Terms
Misrepresented
It is well settled that a contract
procured by fraud in factum is void
and cannot be enforced. Fraud in
factum occurs "where there is
misrepresentation of the character or
essential terms of a proposed
contract."8 When such essential terms
are misrepresented, the other party's
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manifestation of assent is ineffective
because that party believed he was
agreeing to something different from
what was presented.8 A material
misrepresentation is one that "would
be likely to induce a reasonable person
to manifest his assent, or the maker
knows that it would be likely to induce
the recipient to do sO."I86 A failure to
disclose material terms is tantamount
to a misrepresentation.87 Courts have
noted that fraud in factum includes
instances in which a party is told one
thing but the actual written contract
says something else and where there is
"a surreptitious substitution of one
document for another and the innocent
party sign[s] it without knowledge or a
reasonable opportunity to know the
character or essential terms of the
substituted document."8
One example of fraud in factum is the
classic two-contract deceit where a
contractor, for example, will first have
a consumer agree to the repair work -
in the form of a work contract - and
then later force him or her to agree to
the financing in the standard form
contract under the guise that the two
agreements were essentially the same.
However, the second contract,
containing the arbitration clause, not
only was not the same, but it bore no
relation to the agreement the consumer
had been promised. Because of the
contractor's misrepresentations
regarding the essential character and
terms of the standard form contracts,
the consumer's assent is ineffective,
and the contracts should be void.89 The
consumer's signature on the contracts
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has no meaning because the consumer
did not assent to those contracts.90
Federal courts have refused to
enforce arbitration clauses included in
contracts obtained by fraud in factum.
For example, in Cancanon,91 the
plaintiffs, unsophisticated and trusting
consumers who lacked familiarity with
financial matters, signed what was
represented to be a money market
account but turned out to be a general
securities account with a binding
arbitration clause. Their stockbroker
then engaged in high volume,
speculative trades that resulted in
substantial losses. The court held that
where the allegation "is one of fraud in
the factum, i.e., ineffective assent to the
contract, the issue is not subject to
resolution pursuant to an arbitration
clause contained in the documents." 92
In another case, the plaintiff spoke a
bare minimum of English, but was
required to sign documents in English
for a commodities account that
contained a binding arbitration
clause.93 Her account sustained serious
losses. The defendant sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause. The plaintiff resisted, alleging
the defendant knew she could not read
English and that the agreement was
presented for her "signature as a mere
'administrative' document." She also
contended that the fact that the
document was a "contract setting forth
the terms of a binding agreement" was
affirmatively concealed from her. The
court held that arbitration could not be
compelled because fraud in the factum
as to the entire agreement voided the
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contract. Further, the court said, the
majority of courts "confronting this
question directly have held that a bona
fide claim of fraud in the factum as to
the entire contract takes a case outside
the rule of Prima Paint."94
D. Lack of Mutuality - One-Sided
Agreements Subject To Nullification
1. Lack of mutuality of remedy
Arbitration clauses may also be
unenforceable where they are
unilateral and lack mutuality. While
such a clause binds unsophisticated,
trusting consumers and commits them
to an irrevocable waiver of their day in
court, it leaves powerful and more
sophisticated businesses completely
free to choose a judicial forum for the
enforcement of the contracts. Courts
have routinely invalidated such one-
sided agreements that bind one party
to the arbitral forum while leaving the
other free to pursue judicial remedies.
For example, in Northcom, Ltd. v.
James,95 the Alabama Supreme Court
directly confronted the issue whether
an arbitration clause contained in an
adhesion contract that binds one party
to arbitration while leaving the other
party free to choose litigation should
be enforced. That court concluded that
such a clause should not be enforced:
... we hold that, in a case involving
a contract of adhesion, if it is not
shown that the party in an inferior
bargaining position had a
meaningful choice of agreeing to
arbitration or not, and if the
superior party has reserved to
itself the choice of arbitration or
litigation, a court may deny the
superior party's motion to compel
arbitration based on the doctrines
of mutuality and unconscionability.
The court also based its conclusion on
the doctrine that a court of equity
should not compel specific
performance of an arbitration
agreement in the context of a consumer
contract of adhesion where "the party
in the superior bargaining position has
given itself a choice of arbitration or
litigation, but has reserved a right to
compel the weaker party to submit to
arbitration. "96
The court in Lopez v. Plaza Finance
Co. 97 faced an analogous situation and
invalidated an arbitration clause in a
consumer finance contract on the
grounds that it lacked mutuality. Lopez
was a class action challenging the
terms of an installment loan
agreement. Though the clause
appeared to require the parties to
submit to arbitration any claim "arising
out of the contract," in fact the clause
exempted the finance company from
arbitration with respect to "whether or
not the Debtor has committed an act of
default."9 8 The court said that the
creditor defendant had "failed to
identify any class of legitimate claims it
might bring which would not relate to
plaintiff's breach or default," thus
rendering the creditor's promise to
arbitrate illusory.99 The court then
denied the motion to compel
arbitration, stating that "where only
one party is bound to arbitrate, the
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agreement is unenforceable."1 00
In Hull v. Norcom,'0 a terminated
former employee challenged an
employment contract containing a
binding arbitration clause. The clause
one-sidedly permitted the employer to
seek injunctive relief and damages in
any court for a breach of the non-
compete covenant. The defendant
employer sought to compel arbitration.
The employee resisted, claiming that
the clause was invalid because the
parties lacked a mutual agreement to
arbitrate. The court agreed, stating that
the employer's obligation to arbitrate
was illusory, and that an arbitration
agreement "is not mutually binding
where one party reserves the option to
raise and resolve any and all disputes
that it may have against the other party
in a court of law rather than through
arbitration. "102
Some courts do not find lack of
mutuality in and of itself sufficient to
preclude arbitration. For example, in
Lackey v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,103
the South Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed an order finding
unconscionable and unenforceable an
arbitration clause in an admittedly
adhesive contract. The clause at issue
allowed the lender to choose a judicial
forum while denying the borrower the
right to raise a counterclaim in any
such legal action. The court reasoned,
however, that nothing in the clause
prevented the borrower from asserting
the counterclaim, only that the
counterclaim would be subject to
arbitration. The court relied on the
absence of proof that the borrower
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would be prejudiced by arbitration, or
unable to get the same relief available
in a judicial setting. The court believed
it was required to defer to the
legislative policy behind the FAA and
not "view arbitration as an inherently
less beneficial form of dispute
resolution. ' 1°4
Several days before the Lackey
decision, a federal court sitting in the
same state invalidated an employment
arbitration agreement because, among
other things, the clause lacked
mutuality in the "bindingness" of the
arbitration award: the award was fully
appealable by the employer, but not by
the employee.1° An even more recent
decision by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, Zak v. Prudential Property &
Casualty Insurance Company,10 6
invalidated an arbitration clause in an
insurance contract because it gave the
insurer more rights than the insured:
"It is fundamentally unfair for an
insurer to obtain a trial any time an
award it does not like is made while
the claimant or insured is not afforded
a similar right. The procedure offends
notions of due process and equal
protection. " 10 7
A related issue is whether there was
mutual consideration underlying the
contract that made the less
sophisticated party's promise to submit
claims for arbitration enforceable. In
the case of Gibson v. Neighborhood Health
Clinics, Inc.,08 an employee sued her
former employer for discrimination in
violation of Title VI'1109 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.10 The
district court had dismissed the
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employee's claims on the grounds that
she had contractually agreed to submit
her claims for arbitration. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The court reviewed the
enforceability of the employment
contract under Indiana law, the site of
the relevant events in the dispute, and
concluded that there was no
consideration supporting the employee's
promise to arbitrate. Consideration
was not supplied by the employer's
promise to hire the employee or to
continue to employ her because the
offer of the employment was not made
in exchange for the promise to
arbitrate; the employee had already
been hired at the time of the promise.
Also relevant to the court's analysis
was that the contractual language at
issue reserved to the employer the
right to modify, defend or otherwise
change any or all terms of the
employment contract at any time,
without notice. As pointed out by the
concurring opinion, whatever
"promise" was made by the employer
was illusory because it was subject to
the disclaimer language contained in
the employee manual."'
2. Lack of consideration for giving up
constitutional rights
Arbitration clauses, by their nature,
require consumers to give up certain
basic constitutional rights, including
the right to a jury trial and the right to
adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard. The Supreme Court has clearly
held that there must be bargained-for
consideration where a consumer has
given up such rights in an adhesion
contract.
The starting point for this analysis is
the case of D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 112 a case that did not involve a
contract of adhesion. In that case, the
Court held that a contractor, who
repeatedly failed to make payments
due for installation of a refrigeration
system and then negotiated and agreed
to a confession of judgment clause in
order to continue the contractual
relationship, received sufficient
consideration for abandoning the due
process right it would otherwise have
to a prejudgment notice and hearing.
The Court pointedly observed,
however, that:
Our holding, of course, is not
controlling precedent for other
facts of other cases. For example,
where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great
disparity in bargaining power, and
where the debtor receives nothing
for the cognovit provision, other
legal consequences may ensue.113
On the same day that Overmyer was
decided, the Court issued a ruling in a
companion case that involved low-
income consumers giving up the same
rights.14 In Swarb v. Lennox, the Court
affirmed a lower court ruling that the
consumers did not knowingly and
intentionally give up their constitutional
rights. The Court suggested that this
was the type of case it had alluded to
in the Overmyer decision where "other
legal consequences may ensue" as a
result of the contract being one of
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adhesion, the disparity in bargaining
power and the absence of any
consideration received in return for the
relinquishment of due process rights."5
Later in the same term, the Court
issued the decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin."6 In that case, the consumer
had signed a conditional sales contract
that allowed the seller, Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co., to immediately
repossess the merchandise in the event
of default. After a dispute over
servicing a gas stove, Mrs. Fuentes
allegedly failed to make some of the
payments and Firestone seized the
disputed goods. The Court rejected
Firestone's argument that Mrs. Fuentes
waived her due process rights by
signing the sales agreement, observing
that the facts of the case were a "far cry
from those of Overmyer." 1 7
Thus, in appropriate cases, consumer
advocates should highlight the lack of
consideration flowing to their clients
where those clients are compelled by
one-sided arbitration clauses to
abandon constitutional rights.
E. Fraudulent Inducement - Inducing
the Consumer Into an Arbitration
Agreement Through Material
Misrepresentations
It is well settled that an arbitration
agreement that was fraudulently
induced may not be enforced."8 Under
Pennsylvania law, for example,
fraudulent inducement to a contract or
term thereof is shown when there is (1)
a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent
utterance thereof, (3) an intention by
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the maker that the recipient will
thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable
reliance by the recipient upon the
misrepresentation and (5) damage to
the recipient as the proximate result." 9
A key element of fraudulent
inducement is to induce a party to
enter into a contract by means of fraud
or a material misrepresentation, when
the party was under no duty to enter
into the contract. 120
Further, where a contract is a
standard form adhesion contract, the
argument should be made that the
stronger party is obligated to point out
terms which were unusual or
surprising, such as a unilateral
arbitration clause.'2 ' The failure to
affirmatively disclose the arbitration
clause amounts to a material
misrepresentation, which serves to
nullify it.122
In CBS Employees Federal Credit Union
v. Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette,123 the
court relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Prima Paint'24 to hold that
arbitration is not to be compelled
where the agreement itself has been
fraudulently induced. The plaintiffs
alleged that their assent to a margin
agreement and the arbitration
agreement it contained was fraudulently
induced to coerce plaintiffs into
ratifying the unauthorized trading in
their accounts, which had suffered
serious losses.22 The court said that
because plaintiff's fraud claim
involved the arbitration clause, Prima
Paint mandated that a court, not an
arbitrator, should determine whether
the clause was used to further a
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fraudulent scheme.126
More recently, the California
Supreme Court ruled that an
arbitration clause in a health plan
agreement between a hospital and a
patient could be unenforceable due to
fraud in the inducement. 27 Evidence
supported the patient's claims that the
hospital misrepresented the speed of
its arbitration program, a
misrepresentation on which the
patient's employer relied by selecting
the hospital's plan for its employees
and that the patient suffered delay in
the resolution of his malpractice
dispute as a result of that reliance
despite the patient's own diligence.
The court remanded the case to the
trial court to resolve conflicting factual
evidence.128
F. Arbitration Clauses Contravene
Public Policy
In analyzing arbitration clauses, the
consumer advocate should keep in
mind that the FAA was not intended
by Congress to force consumers who
are at a decided disadvantage when
dealing with sophisticated and
experienced business entities to
surrender their right to a jury trial.
Rather, Congress intended the FAA to
apply to ordinary contract disputes
"between merchants." 29 The FAA's
legislative history evinces an "implicit
assumption that it would be invoked
by commercial actors having relatively
equal bargaining power."3 ° In
circumstances where there is a marked
imbalance in sophistication,
knowledge and financial resources as
between the parties, an application of
the FAA is contrary to the intent of
Congress and does not further the
federal policy of favoring arbitration.
Many states recognize public policy
violation as a defense to contract
enforcement. The Delaware Supreme
Court in Worldwide Ins. Group v.
Klopp,'3 ' refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement so unfairly
structured that the insurer could
appeal and get a trial de novo if the
arbitrator's award exceeded the state
financial responsibility limits but the
insured had no corresponding right to
appeal an award below those limits.
The court said that though the
agreement permitted either party to
appeal if the award was greater than
the state financial responsibility limits,
and both parties were bound by a low
award, in reality, the agreement gave
the insurer an "escape hatch" for the
avoidance of high arbitration awards,
whether or not the award was fair and
reasonable. 32 As such, the court
refused to enforce the arbitration
agreement as unconscionable and
contrary to public policy, stating that
"the policy provision at issue here
promotes litigation, circumvents the
arbitration process and provides an
arbitration escape device in favor of the
insurance company."" 3
More recently, in the Hooters of
America, Inc. v. Phillips case, the court
found that the employer's arbitral
scheme was void as a matter of public
policy because it supplanted
numerous, well-defined dominant Title
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VII policies. T' The court noted that the
Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corporation,'-5 had
recognized that statutory claims could
be effectively vindicated in an arbitral
forum. However, where the arbitration
process would preclude such
vindication, the clause was void as a
matter of public policy.136
G. The Magnuson-Moss Act -
Preserving Judicial Forum for
Consumer Warranty Claims
Congress enacted the Magnuson-
Moss Act (the "Act") in 1974 "in order
to improve the adequacy of
information available to consumers,
[and] present deception." 137 The Act
specified clear and comprehensive
requirements regarding disclosures,
duties and remedies associated with
warranties on consumer products. The
products covered by the Act include
any "tangible personal property which
is distributed in commerce and which
is not only used for personal, family or
household purposes."'3
Courts that have considered the
application of the Act to arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts have
ruled that where such contracts
provide for binding arbitration,
consumers cannot be compelled to
arbitrate their claims under the Act.139
The intent of the Act was to preserve a
judicial forum for consumers,
providing that "a consumer who is
damaged by the failure of a supplier,
warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with an obligation under this
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title or under a written warranty,
implied warranty, or service contract,
may bring suit for damages and other
legal and equitable relief." 40 The only
exception recognized to the entitlement
to seek relief in a judicial forum is
where the Act provides for the
establishment of "informal dispute
settlement mechanisms " 41 or "informal
dispute settlement procedures." 1 2 The
Act states that warrantors may
establish such informal dispute
settlement procedures and that such
procedures must comply with certain
minimum requirements to be
promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission. 43 Further, the Act makes
clear that such dispute resolution
procedures and mechanisms are non-
binding on the consumer and must be
resorted to before the consumer may
resort to a legal remedy, such as going
to court. As such, the Act provides for
informal settlement procedures as a
prerequisite, not a bar, to seeking relief
in a judicial forum. 44 And, thus, where
arbitration clauses contained in such
contracts are binding, rather than non-
binding, such clauses conflict with the
Act and are unenforceable.21
V. Conclusion
While the trend to insert unfair and
overreaching arbitration clauses into
standard form consumer contracts
appears to be on the rise, there do
remain a number of grounds for
invalidating such clauses, particularly
when consumers' claims are based
upon violations of statutory rights.
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Attempts to prevent consumers from
asserting those rights in court should
be vigorously resisted.
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